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UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY:
AN EXTENSION THEREOF
STUART RANDOLPI HAYs*
"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth...I
"Cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum. . .Who's is the
soil, his it is up to the sky.2 He who owns the soil, or surface
of the ground, owns to an infinite height."3
Since the earliest embryological state of property ownership,
the common law has reflected the Creation in terms of property
ownership. Adding et ad infernos to cujus est solum ejus usque
ad coelum further reflects this concept:
"From the bowels of the earth to the heavens above,
belongs the air and the earth to he who would own the
surface."4
With a "flat" earth and a short distance to heaven this earliest
concept was satisfied. When to our own horror we discovered
the earth was round, the rule was never modified, even though it
meant the property owner held only a pie-shaped wedge to the
et ad infernos.
Finally, on a windy day in 1903 at Kitty Hawk, North Caro-
lina, the archaic rule of the common law was dealt its mortal
wound. With heavier-than-air flight a reality, the common law
was forced into an evolution so radical as to signify the end of an
ageless rule. Invasion of the air space of another was a necessity
to the fledgling art of flying. The articulate rules of Lord Coke
as enumerated by Blackstone and Kent became a hiatus in the
*Member Virginia State Bar; A.B., College of William and Mary (1957);
B.C.L., College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law (1960);
1st Lt., J.A.G., U.S.A.F.
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31 COKE, Inst. (19th Ed., 1832), c. 1, § 1(4)(a).
4CO. LITT. 4a, 2 BI. Comm. (1902) 18, 3 Kent Comm. (1896) 621.
UNTED STATES V. CAUSBY
swift change. The conservative attitudes of some early courts
resisted the change for a while.5 Theories evolved quickly and
soon it was recognized that the air itself belonged to no one;
indeed, the space above the "usable heights" belonged to every-
one.
6
The purpose of this article is to explore the realm of property
ownership as it pertains to flight, especially as it relates to military
flights and the governmental function of national defense. The
nature of the sovereign's proprietary functions must be examined
closely to determine the aptness of a special series of rules by
which the courts need to examine the military function. It
should be borne in mind that America is engaged in a fight for
existence in a vast fight for man's mind and body; that this fight
is not a recognized military action, but a war of self-survival
based in part on military readiness and massive retaliation. It is
with this readiness and retaliation that this article is most con-
cerned.
The Fifth Amendment should remain a bulwark to the protec-
tion of the citizen, but it should not subvert the miiltary needs of
the nation, as a whole, to unnecessary expenses. This, basically,
is the problem surrounding the creation of "aerial easements" and
"sonic boom" damage claims. In some instances, these claims are
costing the United States Government untold millions of dollars
which should not, in all instances, be paid as damages. The
citizen tends to regard the Federal Government as a mythical
Santa Claus prepared to pay damages at the slightest provocation.
This give-away would cease if the courts of the United States
would pay close and proper attention to the rules of the law.
U. S. ,v. Causby: The Starting Place
The non-directional wanderings of the various courts, both
state and federal, ceased in 1946. It was in this year that the
United States Supreme Court handed down its 5-3-1 decision in
United States v. Causby.7 The common law rule became legal
history.
5U.S. v. One Pitcairn Biplane, 11 F. Supp. 4 (D.C.N.Y. 1935).
6U. S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946).
71bid.
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WILLIAM AND MARY LAw REvmw [VoL. 3:36
An examination of the Causby case is the logical beginning
of the study of aviation easements and the resultant issue of
aviation easement damages. An autopsy of this case will reveal
that there was a "taking" of property for "public use" without
"just compensation" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
The respondent, Causby, owned several acres of farm land on
what has been a private airport near Greensboro, North Carolina.
The airport had been "taken" for the duration of World War II
by the United States Army, Air Force and Navy, as a training
area for single and multi-engined aircraft. The north-south run-
way was 2,220 feet from the respondent's chicken coop and 2,275
feet from his home. A glide pattern 100 feet wide and 1,200
feet long passed directly over the respondent, Causby's, home
and chicken coop, and thence to the end of the north-south run-
way. The angle of ascent and descent was 30 feet to 1 foot,
which was within the current CAB (FAA) minimum require-
ments." Aircraft in this pattern of ascent and descent passed at
heights not less than 83 feet over the ground, 67 feet over the
barn, and 18 feet over the highest trees on the Causby property.
Approximately 4% of all flights used the north-south runway
from 1942 through 1946. The noise of the aircraft at such low
altitudes kept the family awake at night and frightened during
the day. The chickens refused to lay, and about 150 of them
killed themselves when they flew into panic from the noise above
and smashed themselves into the walls of the chicken coop.
These are the facts that solidified the nebulous graspings of
the earlier courts and began to lay down the ground rules of
aero-space law. But Causby applies only to low level ascending
and descending flights, not to sonic disturbances created in the
upper atmospheric areas or to flights occurring at more than
1000 feet above any urban area or 500 feet above any country
area.
The majority of the Supreme Court could not agree with the
minority in that the landowner could claim right to only his
usable and reasonable air space and that he could not lay claim
to a greater amount. Thus is born an aerial version of the Eng-
lish Doctrine of Ancient Lights.
8C.F.R. Cum. Supp., Title 14, c. 1, C.A.R. pt. 61, § 61.7400, 61 7401.
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The majority (Justices Rutledge, Stone, Reed, Frankfurter and
Murphy) then went further and created a new property con-
cept - an aerial easement. This is an easement without founda-
tion on the earth, but one created out of the air itself. This
opinion is based on a single factor: the glide pattern as prescribed
by the CAB (FAA) is below the minimum altitudes prescribed
by the Congress.9 The invasion of this less than minimum pre-
scribed altitude is a "taking of property" for the "public use"
under the Fifth Amendment, and just compensation must follow.
In order for this compensation to flow, the Supreme Court
created the aerial easement.
Fortunately for the majority, the creation of an easement by
eminent domain does not require a passing of seizin. What would
they have done in that instance? It would seem the majority of
the court wanted a reason on which to place its result. Why is
the exception to the minimum altitude rule an invasion of air
space sufficient to create an easement, when the aircraft were
within the minimum altitude glide pattern exception to the
minimum altitude rule? Are aircraft expected to rise mysteri-
ously to the 500 or 1000 foot level? Should a "noise easement"
be granted to people who suddenly find themselves next to a
railroad or turnpike on which heavy trucks or trains are passing
constantly?
The dissenting justices (Justices Black and Burton, Justice
Jackson not participating), based their dissent on five independent
factors, but agreed with the majority on the abolition of the old
common law rule of ownership: "from the bowels of the earth
to the height of the heavens above."
FmST: Any action that did lie should be the creation of a
private nuisance or possibly a public nuisance. Such cause of
action would sound in tort and not in contract under eminent
domain proceedings.
SEcoND: The Court of Claims did not have proper jurisdic-
tion over the subject res. The sovereign, the United States
Government, did not consent to this suit under the meaning of
the Tucker Act.10
949 U.S.C. 180, 10A F.C.A. 49, § 180.
lOTuczker Act, 24 Stat. 505, 28 U.S.C. 1402.
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THnm: There was no violation of the CAB regulations. The
aircraft were within the minimum prescribed ascent-descent
pattern, as was prescribed by the CAB regulations. These regula-
tions have the force and effect of statutory law.
ForTm: The Congress should be given a chance to act in
establishing minimum glide patterns via Congressional legisla-
tion as it did in establishing the minimum prescribed altitudes.
FIFTH: The majority decision is an opening wedge into further
judicial interference with the power of the Congress to develop
new solutions to new problems. Under the provisions of the
commerce clause of the Constitution, the Federal Government,
via the powers of the Congress, is empowered to develop and
enact into statutory law new solutions to new concepts that may
arise in commerce and the intercourse between the various states.
Witness the case of Paul v. Virginia and later its complete
reversal in Southeastern Underwriters v. United States."
In determining the effect of the Causby decision on military
air invasion, several factors must be considered: What is an ease-
ment? Can the Government proceed in eminent domain? What
constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment? What dam-
ages are assessable, if there is a "taking"? What court or courts
have proper jurisdiction? These issues must be resolved histori-
cally in order to predict the future of military and, indeed, all
aircraft operations, when viewed in light of the Causby decision.
A Taking of Property and just Compensation under
the Fifth Amendment
"...nor be deprived of life, limb, or property without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.' 12
Under these particular ground rules, there must be a "taking"
for which "just compensation" must be made. Both of these terms
are nebulous statements of constitutional policy at best and mean
all things to all people.
llPaul v. Virginia, 8 Wall 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869); U.S. v. Southeastern
Undervriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440
(1943).
12U.S. Const., Fifth Amend.
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"... when inroads are made upon the owner's use of it to an
extent that as between private parties, a servitude has been
acquired either by agreement or in a course of time, there
is a "taking" of property...-13
While this is a rather definitive statement of policy, it is inter-
esting when viewed in the light that some days earlier the same
court had said:
'We think it is the function of [Congress] to decide what
is a taking."' 4
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that restric-
tions by the Federal Government or State Government can be
a "taking" of property within the Fifth Amendment. In every
instance, all factors should be considered to determine whether
the restriction has, in fact, resulted in a "taking" or whether the
restriction is merely within the normal police powers under the
Constitution. 5 For example, the destruction of all uses of prop-
erty by floodlights reflecting from an airport has been held to be
a "taking" of property under the Fifth Amendment. 6
"Acts done in the proper exercise of Government powers,
and not directly encroaching upon private property, though
their consequences may impair its use, are universally held
not to be a 'taking' within the meaning of constitutional
provisions.' 7
It should be especially noted at this time that because damages
may result this does not mean that, in fact, there has been a
13U.S. v. Dickenson, 331 U.S. 745, 67 S. Ct. 1382, 84 L. Ed. 1789 (1946);
War Production Board Order (1942) L-208, 7 F. Reg. 7992, 7993.
14U.S. ex tel TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 66 S. Ct. 715, 90 L. Ed. 843
(1946); U.S. v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 78 S. Ct.
1097, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1228 (1958); reversing, 134 Ct. C. 1, 138 F. 2d 281.
15U.S. v. Causby, supra; U.S. v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 339 U.S.
799, 70 S. Ct. 885, 94 L. Ed. 1277 (1949); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322, 28 A.L.R. 1321 (1922).
16U.S. v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 30 S. Ct. 527, 54 L. Ed. 823, 28 L.R.A.
(NS) 385, 19 Am. Cas. 680 (1910); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Co.,
13 Wall (U.S.) 166, 20 L. Ed. 557 (1871).
17U.S. v. Welch, supra.
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constitutional "taking" of property.' The character of the inva-
sion determines whether the "taking" has occurred. Where war-
time Government regulations deprived the property owner of
the most productive use of his property, this was not held to be
a "taking" even though damages did result. If damages were the
sole criteria, this would have been sufficient "taking" of property
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 9 This particular
case involved federal regulations that were designed to shift
workers from nonessential industries to essential war-geared indus-
tries. Only Justice Harlan, in a minority decision, determined
that this constituted an invasion of property rights under the
Fifth Amendment. This view certainly would place Justice Har-
lan with the majority in the 1946 Causby decision. It should be
noted that the federal regulations enacted at this time were enacted
under the war powers of the Constitution. The war powers do not
cease upon the end of immediate and active hostilities. They
continue during the emergency period.2" Regulations enacted
after hostilities may be upheld under the war powers. 1 The
"cold war" situation is not sufficient to invoke the war powers.22
When President Truman seized the steel mills in 1950 under
an Executive Order, the full scope of the war powers, under the
"cold war" situation, was again examined.2s Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Company v. Sawyer stands for all things to all people.24
Justice Black, in the majority opinion (6-3), spoke of the right of
the Congress in exercising its war powers, but stated that the
Executive Branch of Government could not exercise its concur-
rent war powers until there was an actual hot war. America was
not in an active theater of war, nor was there a formal declaration
of war. Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton and Clark
18U.S. v. Welch, supra; Purnpelly v. Green Bay & M. Co., 13 Wall (U.S.)
166, 20 L. Ed. 557 (1871).
I9U.S. v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 S. Ct. 380, 61 L. Ed. 746 (1916); Nunnally
v. U.S., 239 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956).
20Woods v. Lloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 68 S. Ct. 421, 92 L. Ed. 596
(1947).
2 1Woods v. Lloyd W. Miller Co., supra; Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 50
Stat. 751, 752, c. 754, 28 U.S.C. 349(a), F.C.A. (title 28) 349(a).
=Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96
L. Ed. 1153, 26 A.L.R. 2d 1378 (1951).
23Tbid.
24Ibid.
UNITED STATES V. CAUSBY
all concurred in separate opinions. Thus, there were nine opinions
given here, one for each of the Justices. It would appear that the
Youngstown case stands for a recognition of the "cold war" and
its activities, but it would indicate that the court was, perhaps,
not yet ready to extend the war power of the Executive Branch
of the Government into a period of "declared peace" and "co-
existence" even though there was a continuing police action
waxing hot in Korea.
There is no doubt that the Federal Government is not respon-
sible for property injured in a military operation in a theater of
war.21 Based on experiences during the Civil War, the Congress
declared as a statement of policy that Federal Regulations should
differentiate between property requisitioned and property de-
stroyed in the actual area of operation.26 Upon this background,
the Supreme Court in both World Wars determined that prop-
erty requisitioned out of the actual battleground was within the
meaning of property taken under the Fifth Amendment for which
just compensation must be made. 27
It is, then, obvious that the war powers are not the military
answer to avoiding the Causby results. At this time, the country
is not engaged in any form of hot or declared war. We are,
however, engaged in a continuing cold war which may wax hot
at any moment or may remain in the form of limited aggression.
The rationale of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube case is not
sufficient to allow the Executive the use of the war powers. Per-
haps a re-examination of the war power under the cold war situ-
ation is the solution to some of the problems arising under the
Causby decision. Very definitely the cold war situation should
be sufficient to eliminate the great majority of claims arising from
sonic boom when the aircraft creating the disturbance are actively
25U.S. v. Pacific R.R. Co., 120 U.S. 227, 7 S. Ct. 490, 30 L. Ed. 634 (1887);
U.S. v. Russell, 13 Wall 623, 20 L. Ed. 474 (1871); reversing, Mitchell v.
Harmon, 13 How. 115 (1852).
26H.R. Rep. No. 262, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., 39-40 (1874).
27U.S. v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 70 S. Ct. 547, 94 L. Ed.
707 (1950); Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 1434,
93 L.E. 1765 (1949); U.S. v. Toronto Navigation C., 338 U.S. 396,
70 S. Ct. 217, 94 L. Ed. 195 (1949); U.S. v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 69
S. Ct. 1086, 93 L. Ed. 1392 (1949); U.S. v. John Felin & Co., 323 U.S.
373, 68 S. Ct. 1238, 92 L. Ed. 1614 (1948); U.S. v. Petty Motor Co.,
327 U.S. 372, 66 S. Ct. 596, 90 L. Ed. 729 (1945).
1961]
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engaged in proprietary Governmental functions of national
defense.
Where a dam raised the level of an intersecting nearby stream
in a manner so as to eliminate the prior existing subsurface drain-
age but in a manner so as not to flow upon the property, there was
held to be a taking of the property.28 In this instance, the elimi-
nation of the subsurface drainage allowed the normal flow of
water to back up onto the property, thus invading it and render-
ing it useless for its current purpose. The Court found that a
taking of property could occur without an actual physical inva-
sion by a foreign agency where the value of the property was
reduced or eliminated. This result was reached after the decision
in the Causby case and there was cited as a partial basis for its
rationale the Causby case and the creation of aerial easements.
The imposition of a limitation upon the owner's free use of the
property may be a "taking" where a servitude has been acquired
by the Government. Such servitude reduces the alienability of
the property, which, in turn, reduces its actual value. Where the
tideland oil areas were declared in the public domain, by Execu-
tive order, there was no "taking" of property within the Fifth
Amendment. Note that in the Tideland oil cases property titles
did not change, but merely the primary jurisdiction of the sover-
eign.29 The United States asserted its primary sovereignty forcing
Thus, it may be seen that "taking" is without definition-it
must, by necessity of our times, remain in the penumbral zone
of judicial determination. To define it would be to lose the flexi-
bility of Constitutional reasoning and to substitute ex mero moto,
a yardstick of strict stare decis. Assuming that there has been a
"taking" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, what then
constitutes "just compensation"? "Just compensation" is not a
measure of actual or physical damages, nor is it the rule by which
damages are proved. It has been defined as the full equivalent
in money's worth.30 It must be made prior to the actual taking
28U.S. v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 70 S. Ct. 885, 94 L. Ed.
1277 (1949).
29U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 91 L. Ed. 1889 (1946).
the state into the position of secondary sovereignty.
3 OMonongahela Nay. Co. v. U.S., 148 U.S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 662, 37 L. Ed.
463 (1893).
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of the property3 Here is a pillar of judicial reasoning in a hiatus
of changing constitutional theories. Here is a solidarity on which
to base the question of actual damages. The question of "just
compensation" is judicial and not legislative.m "Just compensa-
tion" is satisfied when a reasonable standard is applied to damages
directly resulting and not those held to be consequential or
indirect.P
In summary, a restriction upon property which results in a
declining of its value, usage, or which results in reduced salability
is generally held to be a "taking' of the property within the mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment. "Just compensation" as used in the
Fifth Amendment is basically the receipt of full value for the
property taken.
Easements: Aerial and Otherwise
The Causby doctrine creates a property right in the land of
another where the minimum glide pattern of ascent and descent
are below the prescribed minimum level. It gives rise to the in-
vasion of property rights where flights occur below the minimum
prescribed altitude. It creates a servient tenement previously
non-existent in either the common or statutory law. Generally,
easements can be created in four ways. Most common is the
creation by an express written grant between the property owners.
Generally, the Government, both state and federal, relies upon
the right of eminent domain to create its necessary easements. The
other two modes are generally little used and the subject of much
litigation. They are easements by prescription and by implication
(negative and reciprocal-negative easements). Seldom, if ever,
do military easements arise throught prescription or implication.
However, they may arise as an easement by implication if an ease-
ment apparent is so classified. At least one court has refused to
recognize the creation of a private flight easement via prescription.
apparent is so classified. At least one court has refused to recog-
nize the creation of a private flight easement via prescription.
In this case, a commercial airline could not claim a prescriptive
right in the glide pattern over the land of another where such
31Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 52 S. Ct. 273, 76 L. Ed. 637 (1932).
32Monongahela Nay. Co. v. U.S., 148 U.S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 662, 37 L. Ed. 463
(1893).
33The Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. Ed. 287 (1871).
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glide pattern was below the minimum altitude, as prescribed by
Congress, but within the minimum altitude glide pattern pre-
scribed by the CAB (FAA). 3 4
Glide pattern easements created in the Causby case differ
from other easements. If seizin were an element in the creation
of an easement, then there could be no creation because there is
no touching of the land. Seizin, however, is not an element in
the creation of the easement and hence an easement may be
created in the air space without touching the earth. The courts
have defined easements pertaining to aircraft and their glide
patterns in two categories: clearance of aviation easements.
A "clearance" easement is a negative easement in that it
requires the owner of the servient estate to refrain from exer-
cising certain rights. A "clearance" or "obstruction" easement
restricts the construction or growth of objects or the combination
of both on the servient hereditament. Here there is no physical
taking of the property, but merely a restriction upon its use by the
owner.35 It does not include an easement of flight over the
property.3 A "flight easement" is an affirmative easement that
results in an actual invasion of the owner's air space as per the
Causby case. It results in a "taking" of property through the
physical invasion of the air and it acts as a negative easement or
a clearance easement in that it prohibits the construction or ob-
struction of the air space. It is a mixed easement, consisting of
affirmative and negative elements. The affirmative elements is the
right to invade air space, while the negative element is the duty
of the landowner of a servient estate to keep the flight pattern
free of all structures and natural growth.
In construing these two forms of easements, the courts look
to the intended usage by the owner of the dominant hereditament
to determine what form of easement should ensue.37 The tend-
34Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Co., 84 F. 2d 755 (9th Cir. 1937); cert.
den., 300 U.S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431, 81 L. Ed. 865 (1939).
35U.S.v. Brondum, 272 F. 2d 642 (5th Cir. 1959).
36U.S. v. Brondum, ibid.; U.S. v. 4.443 Acres of Land, 137 F. Supp. 567
(N.D. Tex. 1956); U.S. v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 244 F. 2d 534 (3rd
Cir. 1957).
37U.S. v. Brondum, ibid.; U.S. v. 48.10 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); U.S. v. 29.80 Acres of Land, 131 F. Supp. 84 (N.J.
1956); modifying U.S. v. Russell, 13 Wall 623, 20 L. Ed. 474 (1871).
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ency is to favor clearance or obstruction easements because that
results in the least amount of property taken within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment.38
Once a flight or obstruction easement is created, it becomes
an easement apparent as to subsequent transferees provided
there are regular flights occurring near or over the property itself.
Mere knowledge of the existence or a nearby airport should be
sufficient knowledge to create such an easement. It should be
obvious to the landowner that aircraft do not rise mysteriously
to the 500 or 1000 foot level and that they are not noiseless in
their ascent and descent. It is self-evident that aircraft require
a glide pattern of ascent and descent and that they are noisy.
Eminent Domain: The Creator of Easements
Before the Government may exercise its power of eminent
domain, it must show that under the Fifth Amendment the
property is for "the public use."39 Public uses do not remain
static but are as varied and changeable as history itself. With this
in mind, the Supreme Court, on numerous occasions, has refused
to bind itself to a single universal test as to what constitutes the
"taking" for "the public use."
Where Congress has given the Secretary of War (Defense)
the power to determine what shall constitute a military use, the
courts will not look behind this determination as to the necessity
of taking the property.4° Necessity, as used by the courts in these
instances, applies to the military use of property and is the same
as a "taking" for a public use under the more normal situation of
a taking for a non-military use.41 The military function is always
held to be a public use; therefore, that part of the Fifth Amend-
ment is prima facie satisfied. Therefore, the term "necessity" is
used to determine whether the military installation is needed and
not whether it is a public use. Necessity in these instances is the
same as "taking" for a public use under the Fifth Amendment.
In one instance the Government must affirmatively show that
38!bid.
39U.S. Const., Fifth Amend.
4OCity of Oakland, Calif. v. U.S., 124 F. 2d 959 (6th Cir. 1942); cert. den.,
316 U.S. 679, 62 S. Ct. 1106, 86 L. Ed. 1754 (1942).
41U.S. v. Forbes, 259 Fed. 585 (Ala. 1919).
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the public does, in fact, have a use in the property. In the second
instance, the Government need not show that there is a use in the
public domain for the property, but only that it is needed by the
military for use in the national defense.
As we have seen, public use is the only limitation placed on
the sovereign's power of eminent domain. The state cannot limit
the power of the Federal Government, as its sovereignty is less
than that of the Federal Government.42 To take property under
eminent domain proceedings the Federal Government must pro-
ceed on its own sovereignty and not on the sovereignty of the
state in which the property is located. 3 Nor may it proceed under
state statutes and then receive the property as a "gift" from the
state, if the original proceeding under the state statute was for
the sole benefit of the Federal Government. 4 The armed forces'
right of eminent domain is merely another facet of the Federal
Government's supreme sovereignty. In some instances, it may
also be regarded as an extension of the war powers or an extension
of the law of necessity. Normally, the military rights of eminent
domain are the same as would be used by all other functions of
Government. They must meet the test of need in lieu of public
interest, but are otherwise restricted under the same circum-
stances. However, under the war powers, the sovereign may
enter upon the lands of another for a common defense or in the
exercise of the right of posse comitatus. While this is not the
exercise of eminent domain sovereignty, it is basically similar and
the courts view the process in the same light.45 Under the war
power theories, mere declaration of war is not sufficient, nor is it
a condition precedent to the free use of the property of others.
Rather, the property taken must be in the support of troops and in
the actual theater of military operations.4 Three tests must be met
42U.S. v. Lynch, 188 U.S. 445, 23 S. Ct. 349, 47 L. Ed. 539 (1903); U.S.
v. California, 322 U.S. 19, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 91 L. Ed. 1889 (1946).
43People ex rel Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94 (1889);
Darlington v. U.S., 82 Pa. 382, 22 Am. Rep. 766 (1876).
4jIbid.
45George v. Consolidated Lighting Co., 87 Vt. 411, 89 Ad. 635, 52 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 850, Am. Cas. 1916 C 416 (1914).
46Roxford Knitting Co. v. Moore, 265 Fed. 177 (2d Cir. 1921), 11 A.L.R.
1415; cert. den., 253 U.S. 498, 40 S. Ct. 588, 64 L. Ed. 1031 (1921);
Taylor v. Nashville and C. R.R. Co., 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 646, 98 Am. Cas.
474 (1820).
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then to invoke the war power theory of Constitutional extraordi-
nary powers; that of need, of troop or logistic support, and of an
active theater of operations. The cases supporting this threefold
test date from long before the current cold war situation, and are
based, in a great part, upon the struggle during the Civil War
and in part on World War I, but viewed in light of Youngstown
Sheet & Tube, they appear still to be ruling case law. Again, it
must be emphasized that currently the cold war situation is
insufficient to allow the Executive Branch of Government to
invoke its extraordinary Constitutional powers under the war
powers clause of the Constitution.
Destruction, which is a "taking" under the Constitution
that has resulted from an invocation of a doctrine of necessity, is
a combination of the war powers and the police powers. It is
similar to eminent domain in that it does not require remunera-
tion by the sovereign. The theory of necessity is that society must
satisfy immediate emergency needs through property destruction
in order to preserve itself and large masses of property and civilian
life. The destruction by fires deliberately set as backfires in the
San Francisco conflagration is an example of the use of the
doctrine of necessity. It does not need, as the condition prece-
dent, an immediate emergency but rather an indefinable emer-
gency need. It arises when the public safety is endangered; it is the
sovereign's most superior right of self-preservation. 47 It is based
solely on emergency needs and not on prospective emergency
needs. Martial law may be used to care for prospective emer-
gency needs, but the law of necessity cannot. The current cold
war activities are not sufficient to be considered a condition prece-
dent such as is required to satisfy the requirements of the law of
necessity.
When the sovereign takes possession of the tenanes physical
space, it is exercising its right of eminent domain as if it had pro-
ceeded prior to the physical invasion in a court of law with a con-
demnation suit.48 The owner is entitled to reasonable, certain
47Wallace v. Richmond, City of, 95 Va. 204, 26 S.E. 586 (1897); Bowditch
v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 25 L. Ed. 980 (1&79).
48Cambell v. U.S., 266 U.S. 368, 45 S. Ct. 1115, 69 L. Ed. 328 (1925);
Intertype Corp. v. Clark Congress Corp., 240 F. 2d 375 (7th Cir. 1957);
U.S. v. Merchants Transfer & Storage Co., 144 F. 2d 324 (9th Cir.
1944).
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and adequate provisions for obtaining just compensation before
his occupancy is disturbed, but it is not a condition precedent to
the exercise of the right of invasion of the physical space.49 If at
all possible, the suit should precede the invasion; however, in-
vasion prior to this suit does not in any way effect the property
taken. But interest accrues from the date of the taking to the date
of the bringing of the cause of action.50
The Secretary of the United States Air Force can condemn
property and retain tide in fee simple in the name of the United
States Air Force, such suit being brought in the court of com-
petent jurisdiction in the name of the United States Government.51
This power of the Secretary of the Armed Forces is limited in
one instance. It is a requirement that the advice and consent of
the Senate and House Armed Forces Committee approve that
property to be condemned is valued in excess of $25,000.00, and
is located within the Continental limits of the United States,
Alaska, and Hawaii.52 Each branch of the Armed Forces has
the same right. A fortiori if the Secretary of the Air Force can
take in fee he may take a lesser estate.53 However, where a fee is
taken, the jurisdiction of the state ceases provided the property is
for military usage.5 The Federal Government has restricted it-
self, by regulation, to accepting exclusive jurisdiction only when
the state so cedes and there is a meeting of intentions, which is
analogous to a meeting of the minds in other contractual situa-
tions.5 If it is to be found that there has been no meeting of
intentions, then the jurisdiction of the state and of the federal
government is concurrent.5 6 Jurisdiction or process under eminent
domain is in the district court of the district where the res is
49Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R.R., 135 U.S. 651, 10 S. Ct. 965,
34 L. Ed. 295 (1890).
5072 Stat. 1565, 70A Stat. 148, 10 U.S.C. 2663.
5110 U.S.C. 9773(d)(3).
5210 U.S.C. 2662.
53U.S. v. South Dakota, 212 F. 2d 14 (8th Cir. 1954).
54Ft. Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S. Ct. 995, 29 L. Ed.
264 (1885).
55People v. Dycer Flying Service, U.S. Av. R. 21 (1939); 24 Op. Attny. Gen.
1903-617; 20 Op. Attny. Gen. 1893-611.
56Tbid.
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located.57 If the state is a party then the court of original jurisdic-
tion is the Supreme Court of the United States without regard
to the location of the res.58 If a physical invasion has preceded
the suit for condemnation then the jurisdiction can be determined
under the Tucker Act and may lie either in the district court in
which the res is located or in the Court of Claims, unless a state
is a party and then the jurisdiction will be original to the Supreme
Court of the United States.5 9
In summary, the right of eminent domain is a sovereign right
of the Federal or State Government and is limited by the Fifth
Amendment. The right of eminent domain may be exercised by
the Federal Government and, specifically, by the Armed Forces
of the United States either in a condemnation suit or in an
actual physical invasion of the property prior to the condemnation
suit. Insofar as the military is concerned, there is no need to
prove that the taking is for a public use. There is only a condi-
tion precedent that there must be a need for the military use of
the property. Such need may be established prima facie by an
act of Congress or by adequate regulations. The courts will,
however, judicially examine the amount and mode of assessing
just compensation unless there is a writing entered into between
the parties which is independent of the condemnation proceedings
or there is a settlement dependent upon the ceasing of the con-
demnation proceedings.
Flights of Aircraft-The Creation of Aerial Easements by
Eminent Domain or Condemnation Proceedings
"An entry above the surface of the earth, in the air space
in the possession of another, by a person who is travelling in an
aircraft, is privileged if the flight is conducted:
(a) for the purpose of travel through the air space or for
any legitimate purpose;
(b) in a reasonable manner;
5728 U.S.C. 1331.
5828 U.S.C. 1201.
5928 U.S.C. 1491 (Ct. C1.): 28 U.S.C. 1313 (D.C.); 88 U.S.C. 1201 (S. Ct.);
Jacobs v. U.S., 290 U.S. 13, 54 S. Ct. 26, 78 L. Ed. 142 (1933); U.S.
v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 5 S. Ct. 360; 28 L. Ed. 846
(1884).
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(c) at such heights as not to interfere unreasonably with
the possessor's enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the
air space above it, and
(d) in conformity with such regulations of the state and
federal aeronautic authorities as are in force in the particular
state (in which the invasion occurred)." 60
Thus falls the old rule of cujus est solum ejus usque ad
coelum et ad infernos in favor of a much more realistic view.61 The
justifiable degree of exclusive possession by the landowner extends
upward only to that point necessary for the full use and enjoy-
ment of the property. That which is not exclusive remains as
open and navigable air space.62
Thus we find that the property owner does not own the air
any more than under the English rule of Ancient Lights he could
own the rays of the sun itself. Naturally, the state courts have
followed several divergent views. Some are in favor of following
the usable air space theory as outlined above.6 At least one
court followed the common law rule until 1950.64 Other states
follow the common law rule but regard flights as a privileged
entry into air space and do not allow a cause of action for the
mere invasion.6 1 States following this view require an additional
nexus to give rise to a cause of action for the invasion. What this
nexus is, is again an unanswered question. It may be excessive
noise, dust, or low altitude flight.
6oRESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 194.
61Co. Litt. 4a, 3 Kent Comm. (1896) 621, Coke. Inst. (1832) c. 1, 4(l)(a),
2 BI. Comm. (1902) 18.
62Hinnan v. Pacific Airtransport Co., 84 F. 2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936); cert. den.,
300 U.S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431, 81 L. Ed. 865 (1937).
63Warren Twp. School Dist. v. Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W. 2d 134
(1944); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245, 140
A.L.R. 1342 (1942); Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 819,
99 A.L.R. 158 (1934); Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148
Misc. 849, 266 N.Y.S. 469 (1933).
64U.S. v. One Pitcairn Biplane, 11 F. Supp. 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).
65Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 332 U.S. 292, 64 S. Ct. 950, 88 L. Ed.
1283 (1946); Guith v. Consumers Light & Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21(Mich. 1940); Swetland v. Curtiss Airplane Co., 55 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir.
1932), 83 A.L.R. 319, U.S. Av. R. (1932) 1 (1932); Commonwealth
v. Nevin, 2 Pa. D. & C. 241, U.S. Av. R. (1928) 39 (1922).
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With the advent of the aero-space age, it is anticipated that
the jurisdictions regarding flight as a privileged invasion will
modify their course and fall more directly in line with those fol-
lowing the usable air space theory. It is difficult to imagine cling-
ing to the idea of privilege in the coming age of space and its
exploration. The privilege theory, in effect, recognizes the neces-
sity of allowing the penetration of privileged flights, but still
holds firm to the cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum et ad in-
fernos theory.
The mere noise of flights passing over the property is generally
not actionable unless it is found to be harmful to the health.r
Of course, it can be argued that all noise is harmful to the health,
but the line of cases so holding is limited to hospitals, schools, and
children's camps. In circumstances where the noise is intense
and medically harmful, flights may be enjoined. 67
As a general rule of tort law, noise is not actionable. Avia-
tion should not be required to follow a different set of tort rules.
The noise created by trains, boats, and automobiles, and other
motor vehicles, may be as loud, if not louder than a noise created
by aircraft ascending and descending and flying over the property
of others. A new mode of transportation should not create a new
cause of action merely because of the creation of the new mode
of transportation. Rather the courts should apply the existing
standards modified to the new needs.
The creation of excessive dust caused by low flying aircraft
may be enjoined.r But note, there is a physical invasion of the
property by a foreign substance and not a mere moving of the air
as by sound waves. This stand is similar to the requirement in
the law of torts that fright must be accompanied by actual harm in
order that it may be actionable. Flights at low altitude for landing
and taking off by private aircraft, even though the private air-
craft are within the CAB (FAA) glide patterns, may be enjoined
66Batchelder v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 109, 10 S.E. 2d 529; Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 69 A.L.R. 300
(1930).
67Warren Twp. School Dist. v. Detroit, City of, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W.
2d 134 (1944).
68Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 819, 99 A.L.R. 158 (1934); Gay
v. Taylor, 19 Pa. D. & C. 31 (1932).
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decisions are reached by attaching to the abstraction of noise the
physical invasion of the dust or the bright lights, or the invasion
of the air space, and are not a cause of action created on the basis
of pure noise or fright alone.70 The courts look at the general
for the creation of excessive noise and dust, or for light reflecting
either from the aircraft itself or the landing field.61 These
noise level of urban living and recognize that noise is inevitable
to our civilization. 71 Thus it would be possible for a suit to be
brought to enjoin the operation of a boiler factory whose noise
level is far above that of the general noise level of urban living
and is a constant nuisance. Irregular noises are not as actionable
generally as are high continuing noises. It should be noted that
the injunction lies as a cease and desist order aimed at curbing a
nuisance, either private or public. These injunctions are not
aimed at the "trespass" aspects of the invasion.
Just as the aircraft may not interfere with the property
owner's rights, the property owner may not interfere with the
aircraft. 2 This includes the erection of interfering objects, the
growth of trees and plants, and the projection of lights in a
manner so as to make landing and taking off difficult, if not
impossible. 73
Earlier cases are split as to what constitutes the creation of an
aviation easement and whether an invasion of the landowners
air space is actionable. This problem has arisen in several ways.
Bombing ranges do not give the adjoining property owner a
cause o action.74 Low-flying flights enroute to and engaging in
bombing practice do not create a cause of action. 5 However,
69Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Co., supra; Vandersclice v. Shawn, 21 A. 2d
87 (1942); Delta Airways v. Kershey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245, 140
A.L.R. 1352 (1942).
70Nebraska Silver Fox Corp. v. Boeing Air Transport, U.S. Av. R. (1932) 164
(1931).
71bid.
72United Airports v. Hinman, U.S. Av. R. (1940) 1 (1939); Commonwealth
v. Von Bestecki, 30 Pa. D. & C. 137, U.S. Av. R. (1937) 1 (1937); Iowa
City v. Tucker, U.S. Av. R. (1936) 10 (1935).
73Iowa City v. Tucker, supra; Air Terminal Properties Inc. v. New York, 172
Misc. 945, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 629 (1939).
74U.S. v. Clark, 59 Ct. Cl. 940 (1924).
75Ibid.
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shelling across the property of another does constitute an invasion
of the air space sufficient to create an easement.76 Here it is
impossible to determine whether there is an easement appurtenant
or an easement in gross. The court does not discuss this vital
difference, nor is it able to reconcile its decision with the others
mentioned.
It should be observed at this point that under the commerce
clause of the Constitution, the Federal Government has the
power to regulate air traffiC. Under the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, as subsequently amended, the commerce clause has been
the basis upon which the constitutionality of these acts has been
upheld. It is true, however, that these acts have never been truly
challenged. The reason for this is that the criteria and legislative
intent that would be challenged have been challenged unsuccess-
fully on prior occasions. 78 Where a city attempted to create a
higher minimum altitude than the Federal law had established,
the attempt was held to be unconstitutional. This holding was
based on the theory that the Federal Government had pre-empted
the field of aviation navigation under the commerce clause.79 In
this instance the defendant contended that the CAB (FAA) Act,
Section 551 (a)(7) and Section 601 (a)(7), which allowed the
CAB to set minimum altitudes were delegations in excess of the
constitutional prerogative within the meaning of the doctrine of
76Portsmouth Harbor and Land Hotel Co. v. U.S., 250 U.S. 1, 39 S. Ct. 415,
63 L. Ed. 809 (1919); Peabody v. U.S., 231 U.S. 530, 34 S. Ct. 159,
58 L. Ed. 351 (1913).
77U.S. Const., Art. I, § a, Cl. 2.
78U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18; See, also, Prentice and Egan, THE COM-
MERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1898 ed.)
14. See also, the following cases cited in U.S. v. Causby, supra, as to why
the Congress has the right to legislate air traffic as interstate commerce:
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 168 (1824); The Trade Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879); The Lottery Cases (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321
(1898); The License Cases (Thurlow v. Mass.), 5 How. 504 (1847);
The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall 577 (1881); Granger Law Cases, 94 U.S. 113
(1877); the Shreveport Case (Houston E. & W. T. R.R. Co. v. U.S.),
234 U.S. 342 (1914); Pipe Line Case (U.S. v. Ohio Oil Co.), 234 U.S.
548 (1914); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1898); Sugar Trust Case (U.S.
v. E. C. Knight), 156 U.S. 1 (1895); The Danbury Hatters' Case, 208
U.S. 274 (1908).
79Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Co., 84 F. 2d 755 (9th Cir. 1937); Alle-
gheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F. 2d 812, affirmning D.C.
E.D.N.Y., 132 F. Supp. 871 (1955).
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the "Hot Oil" cases.80 It was held that there was a sufficient
standard by which to delineate the delegation of the authority to
the CAB (FAA).81 Such a standard does not need to be mathe-
matically precise, but merely an intelligible principle by which
to guide the courts in their judicial interpretation of the rules
and regulations proposed under the standard.u
These federal acts which regulate air commerce are bottomed
on the commerce power of the Congress, not upon national
ownership of the navigable air space, as distinguished from
national sovereignty.83
In reporting the bill which became the Air Commerce Act
(now repeal ed), forerunner of the CAB (now FAA) it was
said: 84
The public right of flight.., owes its source to the same
constitutional basis, which, under the decisions of the Su-
preme Court, have given rise to a public easement of naviga-
tion in the navigable waters of the United States, regardless of
the ownership of the adjacent soils.85
Therefore, the federal acts regulating air traffic are deemed
judicially an extension of the commerce clause.86 These acts are a
pre-emption of the states' right to legislate under the Tenth
Amendment.87 The pre-emption by the United States Govern-
80Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, supra; Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 338, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1934); Schecter
Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 836, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1934);
49 U.S.C. § 551(a)(7) & 601(a)(7).
83Lichter v. U.S., 324 U.S. 472, 68 S. Ct. 1294, 92 L. Ed. 1994 (1947).
82Lichter v. U.S., supra; J. W. Hampton Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 48 S. Ct.
348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1927).
83Braniff Airways v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590, 74 S. Ct. 757, 98 L. Ed. 967
(1953).
8449 U.S.C. c. 9 et seq.
85H.R. Rep., 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10.
86U.S. v. Perko, 108 F. Supp. 315 (1952); U.S. v. United Aircraft Corp.,
D.C.D.C., 80 F. Supp. 52 (1948); In re Veterans Export Co., D.C.N.J.,
76 F. Supp. 684 (1947); U.S. v. Batre, 69 F. 2d 673 (9th Cir. 1934).
87U.S. Const., Tenth Amend.
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ment, in addition, does not allow an action in a state court based
upon the tort of nuisance 8 It should be noted that this pre-
emption by the Federal Government could have, indeed, been
more strict in application. Witness the Atomic Energy Acts of
1946 and 1954."9 Under these acts the privileges of patent have
been suspended from those inventions pertaining to nuclear
weapons and inventions pertaining to the use of nuclear material.
It also severely restricts the ownership sale and possession of
certain enumerated nuclear substances.
In summary, there must be an invasion of the rights of the
landowner in a physical manner. This may occur either when an
aircraft penetrates the perimeter of the landowner's mythical line
drawn to the heavens, or it may occur in the instance of a foreign
substance penetrating the close of the landowner's property. In
any or all instances, it is exceptionally unusual for a cause of
action to be sustained if it is solely based on the tort of noise or
the tort of fright; however, noise or fright coupled with a physical
invasion is sufficient to give rise to a cause of action. This cause
of action may be either in tort or in condemnation proceeding
under theories of eminent domain alleging that there was a taking
of property for the public use within the Fifth Amendment. We
discover that there is a close analogy between navigable water and
navigable air space;9 that this analogy has resulted in some courts
attempting to apply the laws of admirality to the laws of flight
without regard to the fact that the laws governing flight should
be somewhat modified in view of the fact that an aircraft is
capable of three-dimensional flight where the average ship is
capable only of surface navigation. The Causby case is the start-
ing place and not the ending place in considering aviation ease-
ments. The Supreme Court has stuck to the Causby decision as
a rock on which to throw the rope of stare decisis, but with the
changing world the Causby case is to be viewed as the Alpha and
not the Omega.
8 Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 824, 243 P. 2d 497 (1952); Crew c. Galla-
gher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A. 2d 179 (1948); State ex rel Helsel v. Board of
County Commissioners of Cuyahoga County, 79 N.E. 2d 698 (1947); 72
Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. 1304.
89Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954; 42 U.S.C. 2011, 60 Stat. 755.
9018 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain, § 68; 72 Stat. 798, 49 U.S.C. 1508(a).
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Statutes: Their Application to the Causby Doctrine
The Preamble to the Civil Aeronautic Board Act declares that
the Federal Government shall have exclusive and complete na-
tional sovereignty over air commerce and transportation. 9 This
sovereignty is within the rationale of California v. United States
in that it grants exclusive regulatory control to the Executive
Branch of the Federal Government and is not a statement of
property ownership.92
The term navigable air space is defined as the minimum safe
altitude of flight as prescribed by Congress.93 This confers an
interstate right of air transit on behalf of any citizen. 4 It also
confers an interstate right of transit based on the Federal pre-
emption under the commerce clause.95
The administration and promulgation of rules and regulations
by the CAB (FAA) is designed to foster, develop and operate a
common system of air traffic with control of navigation consistent
with military and civilian standards.9 In exercising this authority,
the administrator must give full consideration to the needs and
requirements of the military.97
When it is essential to the defense of the United States be-
cause of military emergency or urgent military necessity, and
when appropriate military authority so determines, and when
prior notice thereon is given, the administrator, or such mili-
tary authority may authorize deviation by military aircraft
of the national defense force of the United States from air
traffic rules.98
91U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 91 L. Ed. 1889 (1946).
9244 Stat. 574, 52 Stat. 1028, 48 U.S.C. 180, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. 1304,
72 Stat. 806.
9372 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. 1340.
94Antoniv v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E. 2d 752 (1947).
9572 Stat. 746, 49 U.S.C. 1303(a).
9672 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. 1340.
9772 Stat. 749, 49 U.S.C. 1348(f).
9872 Stat. 806.
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The President of the United States has the additional power to
set aside for the exclusive use of the United States' defensive
forces exclusive area of territorial air space;99 this shall be done
by Executive order.100 This delegation of authority to the Presi-
dent by the Congress has been held to be constitutional, as a
proper standard is used in defining the term "national defense."' 0 '
The Congress, and not the President has the additional right to
enact laws consistent with aviation and aircraft safety alone.
The Secretary of the Air Force, as well as the Secretaries of
the other armed forces, has the right to designate routes in the
navigable air space for use solely as military routes.'1 3 He may
prescribe rules and regulations which do not need to correspond
to existing or proposed civilian rules and regulations.'04 Thus,
military aircraft which are engaged in national defense of the
territorial United States may have their own exclusively defined
air routes. In addition, they may have regulations that are dis-
similar from those prescribed by the Federal Aviation Agency.
These may include a glide pattern ratio less than the currently
prescribed 30-1 ratio. It should be remembered that the basis
of the Causby case was that an easement was established as a
taking of property because the flights were below the minimum
prescribed altitudes as enacted by the Congress. It should be
obvious at this point that the *Congress has the power to specially
legislate in favor of a minimum altitude for the military lower
than the currently enacted 1000 and 500 foot altitude level.
There is nothing to prevent the Congress from reducing the 1000
and 500 foot levels to a minimum altitude of zero, thereby
abolishing the basis for the Causby case.
It becomes more apparent after a perusal of the various
statutes that Causby is a product of equitable thinking rather
9952 Stat. 1029, 49 U.S.C. 174(a).
lO0Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 35 F. 2d 761 (D.C. Ohio1923).
101U.S. v. Pan American Airlines, 39 F. Supp. 297, cert. den., 320 U.S. 751,
64 S. Ct. 56, 88 L. Ed. 447 (1941).
10272 Stat. 806.
lO3Tbid.
10444 Stat. 570, 52 Stat. 1028; 1940 Reorg. Plan, No. 4, § 7, 5 F.R. 2421, 49
U.S.C. 174(e), 54 Stat. 1235, 61 Stat. 501.
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than the result of the application of legal theories. It would seem
that the Supreme Court wanted a result and then supplied an
opinion expressing this result based on faulty reasoning as ex-
posed in the dissenting opinion.
If it is true that in the instant case the Court wanted a result
without regard to legal reasoning and stare decisis, it would have
been far simpler merely to have stated that such flights con-
stituted an invasion of the usable air space of the landowner. It
is not the result that appears to be so wrong, but the reasons
behind it. A house with a poor foundation does not stand long.
For the sake of the application of the rules of law in future cases,
there should be a valid rationale to follow. It has been demon-
strated that the result of Causby could be destroyed by merely
ateringthe rules upon which its flimsy basis has been laid. The
rules should not be subject to such legal erosion. The Court
should have waited for Congress to act, rather than attempt to
enact legislation judicially.
Damages: The Result of Causby
The Fifth Amendment provides that in the instances of a
"taking," "just compensation" shall be made.'05 "Just compensa-
tion" is a term to be used in lieu of damages. 10 In many law suits,
once the cause of action is established and approved, the most
basic issue is that of damages, and to what extent the plaintiff
has been injured in terms of money's worth.
Generally, under the Causby case, and most cases following
it, consequential damages have not been allowed. Under nearly
all modem eminent domain proceedings where the Government
is a party, consequential damages are not allowed.'017 This result
is reached especially in cases where the landowner adjoining the
injured party has suffered an actual injury.'0 The courts often
neglect to mention that these instances are in reality incidental
10549 U.S.C. 174.
106U.S. ex rel TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 279, 63 S. Ct. 1047, 87 L. Ed.
1399 (1942); Mitchell v. U.S., supra; Bothwell v. U.S., supra; Sharp v.
U.S.., 191 U.S. 341, 24 S. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211 (1903).
107Sharp v. U.S., supra.
108U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S. Ct. 357, 89 L. Ed. 311
(1945); Mitchell v. U.S., supra.
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damages and not consequential damages. Where property is taken
in fee, consequential damages may include, but are not limited
to the destruction of business, expenses of moving, and the loss
of good will.109 Such damages are not recoverable.110 Where the
Government took over a laundry during World War II, the
majority (5-4) of the Supreme Court allowed recovery in dam-
ages for the injury done to the trade routes of the plaintiff because
of non-use.' In this instance, the plaintiff was unable to service
its customers along the trade route established by it. After the
War many of these customers went to other laundries to do their
business, thus the plaintiff had an actual economic dedine in
business due to the fact that the Government was running its
laundry and was not operating the trade routes. The dissent in
this case, Kimball Laundry v. United States, is important because
it supports the majority of cases disallowing consequential dam-
ages.1 2 It is important to remember that neither Kimball Laundry
nor Causby was a taking in fee but merely the creation of a lesser
estate. Does this mean that under the doctrine of the Kimball
Laundry case consequential damages will now be allowed where
previously they were considered not actionable? Justice Black,
who gave the majority opinion in the Causby case, wrote the dis-
senting opinion in the Kimball Laundry case. Perhaps this in-
dicates that under the Causby doctrine there will be no such
allowances of consequential damages as under the Kimball
Laundry rule. Justice Frankfurter stands with the majority in
both cases. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion in the
Causby case and dissented in Kimball Laundry. Thus two of the
three remaining judges, who delivered the Causby opinion in
1946, dissented in the Kimball Laundry extension of damages
theory in 1948. It certainly is not impossible that the Supreme
Court will decline to extend the Kimball theory further; however,
insufficient data are available to determine whether Kimball
Laundry and its implications will be extended to include con-
109Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 332 U.S. 292, 64 S. Ct. 950, 88 L. Ed.
1283 (1946); U.S. v. Dickenson, 331 U.S. 745, 748, 67 S. Ct. 1382,
1384, 91 L. Ed. 1789, 1790 (1946).
n10Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 1434, 93 L. Ed. 1765
(1949).
11
'Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., supra; Mitchell v. U.S., supra; Bothwell v.
U.S., supra; U.S. ex rel TVA v. Powelson, supra.
112U.S. v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 78 S. Ct. 1097, 2 L. Ed.
2d 1228, reversing, 134 Ct. Cl. 1, 138 F. 2d 281 (1958).
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sequential damages resulting from an application of the Causby
doctrine and its resultant easements. The case of Eureka Mining
Company v. United States, a 1958 Supreme Court case, would
appear to indicate that perhaps the Kimball Laundry doctrine has
not yet received its blessing from the newer members of the
Supreme Court."3 It would appear from this that the Supreme
Court has recognized some of the problems inherent in an exten-
sion of the Kimball Laundry case, and yet is also cognizant of the
fact that in some instances consequential damages are most
equitable.
Where the damaged party is a licensee or lessee he has a suf-
ficient interest in the property to support a cause of action.114
Therefore, he should share in the damages awarded, but should
not be the sole recipient. In the instances where the property
taken amounts to less than a fee the court must consider what is
left to the landowner as well as to the lessee or life tenant.115
Value, in money or money's worth, is the full value of the fee less
the remaining value to the landowner.'16 Hence, what is full
value must first be established before the remaining value may be
subtracted therefrom to give the present measure of damages to
be awarded the lessee or life tenant. This is perhaps the closest
the courts have come in applying a mathematical formula to the
computation of damages, yet, even this formula has several un-
known factors, namely the full value and remaining value of the
property. At least one district court has held it to be a jury
question as to what constitutes the proper measure of damages
where a leasehold, life estate, or other such lesser estate is
involved." 7 It would seem obvious that the formula of fee value
less remaining value equals damages, is a superior mode of
assessing the amount of damages than throwing the question
open to a layman jury. Where a leasehold is taken, it may be
treated as a fee in computing damages where there is no fair
113A. W. Duckett & Co. v. U.S., 266 U.S. 129, 45 S. Ct. 38, 69 L. Ed. 216
(1925).
n4U.S. v. 1177 Acres of Land, 51 F. Supp. 84 (Fla. 1943); U.S. v. 9.94 Acres
of Land, 51 F. Supp. 478 (S.C. 1942).
115Ibid.
n16Ibid.
117U.S. v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 S. Ct. 596, 90 L. Ed. 729
(1945).
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market value for leases. 18 This particular mode of computation
does not fit under the "remaining value" formula. Damages can
also be what the tenant lost or what is needed to put him in his
original position." 9 This latter mode may include consequential
or incidental damages, and for this reason should be avoided.
Obviously, the instructions to the jury will have to be carefully
drawn, but it is still questionable whether the jury would be
capable of understanding the fine lines drawn between "threct,"
incidental," and "consequential" damages. Thus, the mode of
computing damages becomes important in that it should be a
mode whereby the jury has definitive standards by which to assess
damages. The formula approach would appear to be the best one
under these circumstances. Where the damages result from a
temporary seizure and the property is later returned, under the
Kimball Laundry doctrine, "consequential" damages may be
allowed. 20 Currently, the allowance of consequential damages
under the Kimball Laundry case is limited to "temporary"
seizures; subsequent cases indicate that consequential damages
may be allowed for permanent seizure.
There are various modes in assessing damages under eminent
domain proceedings, but one method appears to be far superior.
This method is the application of the formula that damages are
equal to the fee value less the value remaining to the property
owner. Application of the formula will not solve the problems
arising under the creation of a negative (or clearance) easement.
In this instance the fee value of the property does not decline nor
does the replacement value, which is generally equal to the fee
value, decline. The negative easement prohibits doing something.
This means that the damages may, in certain instances, be equal
to the cost of keeping the property clear, such as the physical
pruning of trees, branches, and bushes. Damages in this instance
may include the value of the land without a tall antenna. What
value is there to a piece of property without antenna? What is
the measure of damages to the owner when he is unable to have
tall trees screening his property? It becomes apparent that the
llSSeaboard Airlines Co. v. U.S., 261 U.S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67 L. Ed. 664
(1922).
119U.S. v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 71 S. Ct. 670, 95 L. Ed. 809 (1950);
Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. Petty Motor Co., supra.
120U.S. v. Sharp, 191 U.S. 341, 24 S. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211 (1903).
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standard mode under which damages are measured do not in
every instance apply to the creation of affirmative or negative
aviation easements.
The application of rules pertaining to navigation and roadway-
created easements are no longer applicable to airway-created
easements. It is readily apparent that a tract once contiguous can
be made non-contiguous by the intrusion of a highway, but what
is not so apparent is the concept of a non-contiguous tract in the
air which does not affect the physical boundaries of the tract on
earth. The courts must meet this problem head-on and create new
rules of damages from the existing criteria by which damages
have been determined in the past.
